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Abstract On the basis of nonfinancial listed companies’ empirical data from 2004 to 2009, this paper investigates the relationship among market development, ultimate shareholders control and the value of corporate capital investment. The results show that both the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of ultimate shareholders and the quality of governmental control over corporations have negative influence on the value of corporate capital investment, and the negative effect of divergence between control rights and cash flow rights is more serious in low growth and high freecash flow corporations. Market development is propitious to improve the value of corporate capital investment and restrains the negative influence of ultimate shareholders on the value of corporate capital investment. However, the positive effect of market development is weak in governmentcontrolled corporations.
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Received: 15 December 2010
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2011, Vol. 1 
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