|
|
|
| Controlling Shareholders Control, Management Incentive and Corporate Over-investment |
| YANG Xing quan,ZHANG Li ping,WU Hao min |
|
|
|
|
Abstract Based on the institutional background of the serious agency conflicts between large and small shareholders, state-owned shareholder and ownership-split reform, this paper gives a theoretical analysis about the effect of management incentive from the perspective of over-investment, besides, using the data from 2004 to 2009 of Chinese listed companies as samples, we identify whether management incentive attenuates over-investment. The results show that both monetary and stock incentives can attenuate over-investment, but the separation of controlling right from cash flow right weakens this effect. The state-owned nature of controlling shareholders weakens the governance effect of management incentive on over-investment, and strengthens the negative influence of the separation of controlling right from cash flow right on management incentive effect. Further investigation indicates that ownership-split reform not only enhances the inhibition of management incentive on over-investment, but
|
|
Received: 11 April 2012
|
|
Corresponding Authors:
YANG Xing quan
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2012, Vol. 1 
浙公网安备 33011802000512号