Abstract：Informal financing risk not only affects the development of the real economy, but also endangers the stability of the society. It is urgent to study the causes and risk management mode of informal financing. In Williamson's discriminating alignment hypothesis, this paper constructed an informal financing discriminating alignment model to assess Chinese informal financing governance reason and mode. We perform a Wenzhou case study and conclude that the governance model and transaction characteristics do not match, which is the governance reason for financing risk. Establish the third-party governance is the best solvency for this problem. Conclusion of this article provided a policy reference for controlling the risk of informal financing so as to provide financial support for entity and achieve steady economic development.
史小坤. 民间融资风险的治理制度原因与治理模式选择——基于温州案例的研究[J]. 浙江工商大学学报, 2015, (5): 92-101.
SHI Xiaokun. The Governance System Reason of Informal Financing Risk and Governance Mode Choice——Based on the Case Study of Wenzhou Area. Journal of Zhejing Gongshang University, 2015, (5): 92-101.
TIMOTHY J. BESLEY & ALEC R. LEVENSON..The role of informal finance in household capital accumulation: Evidence from Taiwan [J].Economic Journal,, 1996, 106(06):38-59
[2]
HAND S.CKIRTON. The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations: Evidence from the Jamaican ‘Partner’[J].Journal of Development Economics, 1999, 60(1):173-194
[3]
MAITREESH GHATAK & PRIYANKA PANDEY.Contract choice in agriculture with joint moral hazard in effort and risk[J].Journal of Development Economics, 2000, 63(2):303-326
[4]
MARY KAY GUGERTY.You Can’t Save Alone: Commitment in Rotating Savings and Credit Associations in Kenya[J].Economic Development and Cultural Change, 2007, 55(2):251-282
[5]
HOFF KARLA & STIGLITZ JOSEPH E.Moneylenders and Bankers: Price-increasing Subsidies in a Monopolistically Competitive Market[J].Journal of Development Economics, 1997, 52(2):429-462
2015, Vol. 
浙公网安备 33011802000512号