Based on the complexity and excessive optimism in the decision-making of fresh e-commerce, the article introduces overconfidence to the trilateral moral hazard analysis framework of e-commerce, farmers and origin agents, analyzes the impacts of the overconfidence level of e-commerce on the payoffs, and on the moral hazard of e-commerce, farmers and origin agents, and discusses the regulatory role of compensatory contract design on the trilateral moral hazard. Results show that the overconfidence of the e-businesses has a dual role on the contract structure. On the one hand, it can increase farmers’ income while decreasing the farmers’ violation of rules; on the other hand, it can save the efforts of origin agents while increasing the agency costs. Compensatory contract design can effectively avoid the trilateral moral hazard. It lowers the moral hazard of e-businesses and of the origin agents, and decreases the farmers’ violation of rules at the same time.