Supply Chain Finance is one of the important financial innovations emerging in recent years, intended to solve the SME’s financing problems. However, so far the academic study often takes the classical principal agent model as a basic model while ignoring the existence of reciprocal preference between financial participants of supply chain. This article briefly reviews development of the principal-agent theory, combines with reciprocal preferences theory proposed by Rabin, expands the level of supply chain finance to level of behavioral economics research. Taking the prevailing principal agent relation between core firms and collaborative firms as the subject, the paper conducts comparative analysis the earnings of different parties after the introduction of reciprocal preference. Firstly, efforts are made to build classic Holmstorm and Milgrom models to study the earnings when the core firm and the cooperative firm are both rational entity; secondly, comparative analysis of changes in earnings of different parties is conducted by introducing the reciprocal preference to Holmstorm and Milgrom models; thirdly, the paper analyzes the data case study in detail by the method of calibration of parameters; at last, it gives possible outlook on development direction of the models in the future. The results show that by introducing reciprocal preference, under certain mathematical conditions, there may exist Pareto improvement space for the contract system design between the core firms and collaborative firms.