|
|
|
| Industry Environment, Supervision Intensity and the Choice for Credit of Food Enterprises in China: Analysis Based on Incentive Compatibility Constraint Conditions |
| WANG Changwei,GU Haiying |
|
|
|
|
Abstract The state of food companies’ credit determines the level of food safety. Considering the credit attribute of food, the interaction of food supply chain and the industry effect, the appeal for credit has shown a certain degree of urgency and credit. Based on the P-A theory, this paper finds the condition of incentive compatibility constraint, and analyzes the effect of industry environment and supervision intensity to the credit decision of food enterprises. Due to the lack of screening mechanism of credit, the complexity of food supply chain, and the poor regulation, the credit food companies in our country lack the market incentives, and the non-credit food companies are not duly punished. These lead to the lack of credit of food enterprises in our country.
|
|
Received: 26 December 2012
Published: 15 August 2013
|
|
Corresponding Authors:
WANG Changwei
E-mail: jswangchangwei@163.com
|
|
|
|
| ［1］ |
BROWNE, C.A. Life and chemical services of Frederick Accum[J].Journal of Chemical Education, 1925（2）:829-851
|
| ［2］ |
PETER S. Food fraud: a current issue but an old problem[J]. British Food Journal,2010(2):198-213
|
| ［3］ |
BRYN J, PETER N. Shareholder value versus stakeholder values: CSR and financialization in global food firms[J]. Socio-Economic Review，2011 (2): 287–314
|
| ［4］ |
UDITH K, SPENCER H. Economic Incentives for Firms to Implement Enhanced Food Safety Controls: Case of the Canadian Red Meat and Poultry Processing Sector[J]. Review of Agricultural Economics, 2006(4):494-514
|
| ［5］ |
MIGUEL C, BRUCE A. Reputations, Market Structure, And The Choice Of Quality Assurance Systems In The Food Industry[J]. America Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2007(1): 12-23
|
| ［6］ |
HAND F，ELODIE R. The implementation mechanisms of voluntary food safety systems[J]. Food Policy, 2010(5):412-418
|
| ［7］ |
ANDREW S. Moral Hazard: Inspection Policy,And Food Safety[J]. America Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2005(1): 15–27
|
| ［8］ |
Hirschauer N., Mussho O. A game-theoretic approach to behavioral food risks: The case of grain producers. Food Policy, 2007 (32)：246-26
|
| ［9］ |
郝丽风，李莉.食品行业诚信缺失的经济学分析[J].经济与管理，2005（4）：35－37
|
| ［10］ |
王辉霞.食品企业诚信机制探析[J].生产力研究，2012(3):88-90
|
| ［11］ |
李红.我国食品企业诚信缺失原因及对策[J].长江大学学报(社会科学版)，2010（12）：
|
| ［12］ |
NELSON, P. Information and consumer behavior[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1970（78）: 311-329
|
| ［13］ |
ANTLE, M. Economics Analysis of Food Safety[M]. Handbook of Agricultural Economics, 2001（1）:1083–1136.
|
|
|
|
2013, Vol. 
浙公网安备 33011802000512号