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| The Economic Analysis on the Regional Public Brand of Agricultural Products: A Signaling Game Model Based on Reputation |
| TU Chuan qing1,2,WANG Ai hu3 |
| 1. Jiangxi Agricultural University2. South China University of Technology3. |
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Abstract In spite of the rigorous development of regional public brand of agricultural products in our country, there is still much controversy about it in the academic circles. In this paper, a signaling game model based on reputation is used to analyze the value of the regional public brand introduced to agricultural markets. In our country, agricultural production is organized mainly according to the household unit, with a small scale and much concern for short-term gains. Meanwhile the consumer is not willing to afford the high price for Brand Agricultural Products, which leads to the lack of enthusiasm about building agricultural product brands. As a result the agricultural products market slumps into low quality equilibrium because of asymmetric information. Therefore, in order to ensure the effective supply of the brand agricultural products market, the government should provide support for the brand construction of agricultural products. Compared with providing direct subsidies for each
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Received: 05 March 2012
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Corresponding Authors:
TU Chuan qing
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2012, Vol. 1 
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