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| Endogenous Transaction Cost: Does It Drive Or Resist The Value Creation of The Strategic Alliance? |
| WANG Feng HU Pei |
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Abstract For acquiring the economies of division and cooperation, the strategic alliance is the endogenous equilibrium outcome resulting from selecting the specialization level between the interactive members. Because of the information asymmetry between the members who have different endogenous comparative advantages,the endogenous transaction cost is caused by the opportunism actions. Further, the main objective of alliance members is to compete for the benefits of value creation in the “win-win” alliance of complete division structure C. The endogenous specialization advantage and information asymmetry between the members, are the original source of cooperation economies, as well as resulting in the endogenous cost while it fails to obtain the Pareto optimum.
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Received: 04 March 2008
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Corresponding Authors:
WANG Feng
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2008, Vol. 1 
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