Journal of Business Economics
Home
|
About Journal
|
Editorial Board
|
Instruction
|
Subscriptions
|
Messages
|
Contacts Us
|
Chinese
2009
,
Vol. 1
Issue (2)
: 47-51
DOI
:
公司治理与战略管理
Current Issue
|
Next Issue
|
Archive
|
Adv Search
|
A Study on Supervisor’s Collusion-proof Incentive Mechanisms
Qing Shi－Song
Abstract
Figure/Table
References
Related Citation (3)
Download:
PDF
(0 KB)
HTML
(1 KB)
Export:
BibTeX
|
EndNote
(RIS)
Key words
：
board of supervisor
principal- agency theory
collusion
incentive mechanisms
Received:
25 April 2008
:
F276.6
Corresponding Authors:
Qing Shi－Song
Service
E-mail this article
Add to my bookshelf
Add to citation manager
E-mail Alert
RSS
Articles by authors
Qing Shi－Song
Cite this article:
Qing Shi－Song. A Study on Supervisor’s Collusion-proof Incentive Mechanisms[J]. , 2009, 1(2): 47-51.
URL:
http://zzs.zjgsu.edu.cn/gl/EN/
OR
http://zzs.zjgsu.edu.cn/gl/EN/Y2009/V1/I2/47
[1]
ZHANG Hao.
Retail Competition, Channel Power and Upstream Cartel
[J]. , 2014, (3): 12-21.
浙ICP备05073962号
浙公网安备 33011802000512号
Copyright © Journal of Business Economics
Supported by: Beijing Magtech
2009, Vol. 1 Issue (2): 47-51 DOI: 
浙公网安备 33011802000512号