|
|
Labor contracts signed in decision-making behavior of the Game |
ZHANG Zong-he WANG Wei |
|
|
|
Abstract This paper applies Herbert Simon's method to analyze the four combinations of behavior in signing of labor contract, pointing out that under normal circumstances it is a long-term rational choice for both employers and employees to sign labor contracts. However, because of the power imbalance, unreasonable contract and higher right-safeguarding costs, both parties will deviate from the long-term rational choice. Furthermore, we find that the recent revision of labor contract law in order to protect the interests of workers affects their behavior of both employers and employees. The improvement of social knowledge about labor contract law, the warranty of fairness, the reduction in right-safeguarding costs and the elimination of information asymmetry are necessary to raise signing rate.
|
Received: 18 November 2008
|
Corresponding Authors:
ZHANG Zong-he
|
|
|
|
|
|
|