|
|
|
| Ownership Structure, Legal Protection and the Excessive Benefits of Control—Evidence from Listed Companies in China |
| LIU Liyan,XIONG Sheng xu |
|
|
|
|
Abstract Excessive benefits of control imply that protecting minority shareholders does not conflict with the controlling shareholders’ reasonable benefits. But how can the controlling shareholders’ excessive benefits of control be reduced without hurting their reasonable benefits? The paper examines the control transactions during 2005 and 2007 in Chinese stock markets, and finds that the number of pyramidal levels of the ultimate controlling shareholders is positively related with their excessive benefits of control, while the legal protection is negatively related with the excessive benefits of control. The enlightenment to us is that shortening control chain and simplifying the control structure can curb the extraction of ultimate controllers, which is in align
|
|
Received: 10 January 2011
|
|
Corresponding Authors:
LIU Liyan
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2011, Vol. 1 
浙公网安备 33011802000512号