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SONG He1, YU Jingjing2, HE Dexu3 |
1.School of Finance, Shanghai University of International Business and Economics
2.School of Finance, Capital University of Economics and Business
3.Institute of Financial Strategy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences |
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Abstract Existing studies pay more attention to a series of “consequences” brought by management overconfidence, and there are few studies on the “antecedents” affecting management overconfidence. This “top heavy” asymmetric research has caused obstacles to an in-depth understanding of management overconfidence. Taking the M&A events completed by Chinese GEM listed enterprises from 2012 to 2017 as the research sample, this paper studies the impact of venture capital on management overconfidence and the consequences of M&A from the perspective of M&A. The research results show that VC can restrain the management overconfidence behavior in M&A, and VC can reduce M&A premium by restraining the management overconfidence in M&A. The above effects are more significant in private enterprises or the enterprises with directors appointed by venture capital. Further analysis shows that after considering the possible impact of the reverse causal relationship between venture capital and management overconfidence, the interaction between the “external” supervisory role of venture capital and the “internal” supervisory role of corporate board governance, the above conclusion is still significantly valid.
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Received: 14 September 2021
Published: 15 March 2022
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