Based on the principal agent theory and from the perspective of the supervision function of the actual controller, this paper studies the influence of the actual controller holding several listed companies at the same time on the excessive on-the-job consumption. We find that when the actual controller controls a number of listed companies at the same time, the level of excessive on-the-job consumption is significantly higher than that of other listed companies. Further research shows that property right nature and external governance environment can have a significant impact on the relationship between them. Private enterprises and enterprises with higher analysts’ attention, holding a number of listed companies has no significant impact on excessive on-the-job consumption. Enterprises with higher media supervision and after the 18th National Congress, holding a number of listed companies has significantly inhibited the promotion effect of excessive on-the-job consumption. This research not only enriches the literature of the actual controller supervision and the excessive on-the-job consumption, but also has the important practical significance for the actual controller to effectively manage the company.