Many enterprises compete to hire independent directors with multiple directorships as they have accumulated rich experience and high reputation. However, there is little research on how to recruit these excellent independent directors and why they accept positions from firms with high uncertainty. Based on the theory of the integration of signals and incentives of independent directors, this paper empirically studied the mechanisms of independent director recruitment for entrepreneurial IPO firms using the data of GEM IPOs. The results show that: first of all, IPO firm reputation, social relations and payment provided to independent directors could be the signals of the corporate legitimacy and interests of the position, stimulate independent directors’ reputation, relation and economic motivations to accept the position and help firms to attract independent directors with multiple directorships. Secondly, multiple signals of IPO firms and multiple motivations of independent directors including reputation, relations and payments are mutual substitutions to a certain extent for attracting and motivating independent directors. Further research also found that with the listing date approaching, it would be more and more difficult for IPO firms to recruit independent directors with multiple directorships, and the attracting and motivating roles of firm signals to independent directors would change as the time and context changed.