The attention and debate on distributive justice in the field of moral philosophy focus on two major issues: “why equality is necessary” and “what equality is necessary”. The former is reflected in the examination of interpersonal heterogeneity, while the latter reflects the exploration of equality evaluation standards. It is precisely based on different dimensions of conditions that different egalitarian concepts have emerged. The widely circulated ones are Rawls' focus on primary goodness equality in the rationalization of political and economic systems, Dworkin's emphasis on resource equality in the possession or distribution of social resources, and Amartya Sen's emphasis on the “feasible ability” equality of individual rights. To a large extent, these egalitarianisms are built on the basis of criticizing utilitarianism and welfarism, and are based on a specific dimension of distributive justice construction. At the same time, the transition from “primary goodness” to resource equality and then to “feasible ability” equality reflects a deepening of understanding of the connotation of equality, and is based on the promotion of understanding of interpersonal differences and personal responsibilities. It is precisely based on this logic that a series of egalitarian advances have promoted a deeper understanding of social fairness and distributive justice, and promoted the institutional evolution of social cooperation and justice order. Therefore, sorting out the development history of the ideas of distributive justice and social order will help to have a deeper understanding of the income distribution and policies implemented in current society based on common prosperity, and promote the development and improvement of economics by combining market economy and social equity.