Abstract：China`s economic growth relies deeply on political incentive. Local government officers` actual tenure plays decisive influence on the local economic growth. Based on 1978-2018 contemporary China local government officers` actual tenure and survey results, this paper concludes that five-year fixed tenure system has gradually shrunk as three-year administration, meanwhile the major local government officers frequently face office change in the third year in office. Accordingly, political tenure and economic factors, especially fixed-asset-investment, shapes the significant tenure cycle featured as an inverted-U shape withthree-years-up and two-years-down. The western scholars adopt political business cycle theory to explain political alternation`s shock to economic adjustment. These existing empirical studies have gradually confirmed that China also has significant political business cycle. This paper proposes that tenure cycle is the decisive core of China`s political business cycle, and China model as well, which forms a new perspective on China`s economic growth. Accordingly, tenure control has also become an important policy tool for the central government's macroeconomic control.
姚金伟. 任期周期：中国经济增长的新视角[J]. 浙江工商大学学报, 2020, 34(3): 90-99.
YAO Jinwei. Tenure Cycle: A New Perspective on China's Economic Growth. Journal of Zhejing Gongshang University, 2020, 34(3): 90-99.
2020, Vol. 34 
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