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Heterogeneity of Institutional Investors, Nature of Actual Controller and Monetary Compensation of Bank Executives |
HAN Liangliang |
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Abstract This article studies the role of institutional investors in the process of the compensation regulation of financial institutions in our country. The results indicate that institutional investors' shareholding ratio and bank executives' monetary compensation has a significant negative correlation in the central governing bank, and has a significant positive correlation in the non central bank, which suggests that the nature of the actual controller affects the role of institutional investors in the bank executive pay making. Investment leading institutional investors and bank executives monetary compensation have a significant negative correlation in the non central bank, and the business-oriented institutional investors' and bank executives' monetary compensation has a significant positive correlation in the non-central bank, which indicates that the different institutional investors will choose the “supervisor” or “collusion” role according to the nature of the actual controller during the bank executive compensation making.
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Received: 15 March 2016
Published: 15 October 2016
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Corresponding Authors:
HAN Liangliang
E-mail: hanliang828@126.com
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