The cause of the farmer cooperatives’ loose development in China is the rural elite group action and coordination failure caused by resource complementarity. The generally dependent on elites may offer an “elite solution” for this problem. The dual utility model shows that the elites in cooperatives pursue not only the economic benefits but also prestige, achievability and other social benefits. Their behavior possesses the dual characteristics of altruism and self-interest. Elite altruistic behavior could guide cooperative out of the low-level equilibrium trap. However, the improvement in operating conditions of cooperative will make the elite attach more importance to economic benefits and seek higher allocation proportion. The outcome is usurped by the elite. Fortunately, the increasing social benefits could further stimulate their altruistic behavior, and conduce to achieve the “benefit-sharing risk-sharing” high levels of cooperation. So the government should take some measures to strengthen the altruistic behavior of elites, promote the evolution of farmers’ cooperation order.