Abstract: Inspired by recent changes of supervision policies in advance selling on mainstream e-commerce platforms, this paper discusses how platform policies, retailers' strategies and consumer purchase decisions affecteach other, adjust and form long-term trends. A tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed, and the possible equilibrium and stability are discussed through theoretical analysis and simulation. The results show that three stable equilibriums of different qualities may evolve under different conditions and two of them can be improved. The three parties worked together to build the equilibrium, but the platform supervision plays a leading role. A better equilibrium can be achieved by implementing precise supervision, standardizing transaction, punishing violations to guide retailers to comply with the rules, and creating a good environment to attract consumers. However, platform supervision is limited by costs and other conditions, and may not be optimal. Platforms need to balance costs, benefits, and impacts on the other two parties. Meanwhile, it is also necessary to pay attention to the policy changes of external competitive platforms and constantly adjust regulatory strategies to maintain their advantage. The research results can be used to analyze the trend of supervision policies of advance selling, propose solution plans, and help promote the healthy development of the market.
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