In recent years, the phenomenon of substandard performance commitment in the process of M&A is frequent, which has aroused widespread concern in the theoretical and practical circles. Based on the M&A events of A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2017, this paper explores the relationship between performance commitment and executives' shares selling. The results indicate that compared with the listed companies without performance commitment, executives of listed companies with performance commitment are more likely to sell their shares in the year of M&A. Also, the long-term market performance of the listed companies with performance commitment is worse after the executives' shares selling, which verifies the arbitrage view of performance commitments. Further analysis shows that this arbitrage degree is more obvious in non-state-owned enterprises, and high-quality internal control, more analyst attention, and more M&A inquiries can effectively inhibit the executives' shares selling for arbitrage in M&As with performance commitment. This study not only provides theoretical and empirical evidence for understanding the arbitrage motivation of performance commitment agreement, but also provides reference for improving the relevant system of performance commitment in M&As, preventing potential insider trading, protecting the rights and interests of small and medium-sized investors and maintaining the effective order of capital market.