The two-sided market is the typical character of the Logistics Information Platform which focuses on the matching of shippers and drivers. However, the price is a major benefit game instrument of the Logistics Information Platform between its bilateral users of shippers and drivers. This article analyzes the pricing strategies of the Logistics Information Platform by using the theory of the two-sided markets, analyzes the pricing strategies of the platform from the perspective of bilateral pricing and unilateral pricing of the monopoly platform, then comparison and sensitivity analysis are performed, and expand to the scenario of competitive platforms. It is found by analysis that the price of the shipper is relative to network externality, which will be positive when shippers’ network externality is higher than drivers’ and negative when less than drivers’. The price of drivers is relative to the value-added service revenue, which will be positive when the value-added service revenue is less than a threshold and negative when more than the threshold. The platform’s profit of unilateral pricing is less than the bilateral pricing. Finally, this article conducts a case analysis for one logistics information platform in China.